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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper examines the ambiguity in sentences like the following: 
 
(1) A secretary cried after/before/when each executive resigned. 
 
It is observed in Artstein (1995) that sentences like (1) are at least two-ways 
ambiguous.  For instance, the sentence with after has the single-time reading in 
which all executive resign at the same time and it is followed by the crying of a 
secretary, and the dependent-time reading in which each resignation at different 
times is followed by a possibly different secretary.1 
 An interesting fact also noted by Artstein is that this type of dependency is 
only found in temporal adjunct clauses (henceforth TACs) and not in other kinds 
of adjunct clauses.  Thus, the following sentence is unambiguous, yielding only a 
single-time reading. 
 
(2) A secretary cried if/although/because each executive resigned. 
 
Artstein argues that this is due to a special semantic mechanism of TACs.   
 In this paper, I argue on the contrary that a syntactic operation, i.e., the 
raising of TACs, along the line of von Stechow (1995), is responsible for the 
ambiguity.  The paper is organized as follows: In the following section, I review 
Artstein’s analysis and present some problematic examples.  A simple syntactic 
analysis, namely QR is considered and rejected in section 3.  Section 4 proposes a 
solution and its formal semantics.  In the last section, I consider remaining issues. 
 
                                                
 I would like to thank Christopher Tancredi and Kyle Rawlins for comments, discussion and/or 
judgments.  This research is partially supported by the KAKENHI grant (17720117, 20520361) by 
the Ministry of Education Culture, Science and Technology, and Japan Society for the Promotion 
of Sciences.  All errors are of course mine. 
1
The sentence also has what Artstein (1995) calls an aggregate reading, according to which 
each executive resigned at different times and after all the resignations, one secretary cried.  It may 
seem at first sight that this reading and the single-time reading are indistinguishable, the latter 
being a variant of the former.  But Artstein argues that independent mechanisms to derive both 
readings are needed.  At this point, the distinction is not important for our discussion, and so we 
continue to assume that relevant sentences are two-ways ambiguous.  We will come back to this 
later. 
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2.  A Semantic Approach: Artstein (1995) 
 
Artstein argues that TACs are temporal generalized quantifiers and they become 
so via an implicit existential determiner (IET).  An implicit existential determiner 
can be applied at different stages of temporal clauses; it can be applied before or 
after the embedded subject (each executive) forms a VP with the predicate, as 
shown below:   
 
(3) a. A secretary cried after [IET [each executive resigned]] 
 b. A secretary cried after [each executive [IET [resigned]]] 
 
(3)a yields a single-time reading. This is because, first, the implicit existential 
determiner takes scope over the embedded subject, and then the entire TAC takes 
scope over the main clause.  A dependent-time reading is obtained in (3)b since 
the embedded subject, which takes scope over the implicit existential determiner, 
also takes scope over the main clause.   
 Let us now examine the semantics in detail.  VPs denote properties of 
times, i.e., of type <i,t>.  The VP Bill cry, for instance, denotes !t[cry(bill)(t)], the 
property of times at which Bill cries.  Two operations apply to the VP denotation 
to yield the truth conditions.  One is called contextualization and the other 
existential closure.  The former introduces the temporal context variable t*, within 
which the sentence is evaluated.  The latter existentially binds the temporal 
variable of the VP.  The final representation is " t[t # t* & cry(bill)(t)].2 
 VPs in TACs, however, are not existentially closed.  Instead, VPs turn into 
temporal generalized quantifiers via an implicit existential determiner, whose 
semantics is !I!J" t[I(t) & J(t)].  When it is applied to the embedded VP in (3)a, 
the existential quantifier in the implicit determiner takes scope over the embedded 
clause, which contains the universally quantified subject.  The denotation of the 
TACs and the truth conditions of (3)a are given below3: 
 
(4) a. !I"t[t # t* & $x[executive(x) % resign(x)(t)] & I(after(t)(t*))] 
 b. "t[t # t* & $x[executive(x) % resign(x)(t)] & "y[secretary(y) & "t' [t' 
# after(t)(t*) & cry(y)(t')] 
 
The resulting representation yields a single-time reading, which says that there is 
a time at which all executives resigned, and it is followed by the crying of one 
secretary. 
                                                
2
In most of his paper, Artstein does not deal with tense for the sake of simplicity.  But see 
section 2.5. of his paper. 
3
The denotation of after is the following: [[ after ]]  = !T<it,t>!J[T(!t[J(after(t)(t*))])], where 
after(t)(t*) is the interval spanning from the end of (t*) to the end of t when t # t*; undefined 
otherwise. 
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 When, on the other hand, the implicit existential determiner is applied 
inside the VP before the subject is introduced, as in (3)b, the subject NP takes 
scope over the existential quantifier, which in turn takes scope over the matrix 
clause, yielding a dependent-time reading, as shown below: 
 
(5) a. !I$x[executive(x) % "t[t # t* & resign(x)(t) & I(after(t)(t*))]] 
 b. $x[executive(x) % "t[t # t* & resign(x)(t) & "y[secretary(y) & "t' [t' 
# after(t)(t*) & cry(y)(t')] 
 
The representation in (5)b yields a dependent-time interpretation, according to 
which each executive resigned at possibly different times, and each resignation is 
followed by the crying of a possibly different secretary. 
 Under this analysis, the contrast between TACs and non-TACs in (1) and 
(2) regarding the availability of dependent-time readings can be explained as 
follows: There are two ways to bind a temporal argument of predicates.  One is by 
the existential closure and the other is by the implicit existential determiner.  The 
former is applied at the top of all non-TACs and the latter is introduced in TACs.4  
The implicit existential determiner turns TACs into temporal generalized 
quantifiers, and this makes it possible for TACs to take scope over the matrix 
clauses.  Since the implicit existential determiner is not applied in non-TACs such 
as if/because/although-clauses, they cannot take scope over the matrix clauses.  
Thus, a quantifier in these clauses may not take scope over another quantifier in 
the matrix clauses. 
 I now turn to some problematic examples.  First and most problematic I 
believe is the example like this: 
 
(6) Every secretary cried after an executive resigned. 
 
The sentence is ambiguous between the single-time reading in which a single 
executive resigned and it is followed by the crying of every secretary, and the 
dependent-time reading in which each crying follows the resignation of a possibly 
different executive.  The latter reading cannot be obtained under Artstein’s 
analysis.  This is because the subject of the TAC can take scope over or under an 
implicit existential determiner, but the matrix clause always takes scope under the 
TAC since it is a semantic argument of the TAC, which is of a generalized 
quantifier type.  Here are the two translations obtained: 
 
                                                
4
Existential closure is sometimes applied to TACs to derive the aggregate readings in sentences 
like Bill resigned after John disappeared every Friday.  The sentence has a reading which is true 
when Bill resigned after a certain period, in which John disappeared every Friday.  This reading is 
derived first by applying existential closure to the embedded clause John disappeared and then 
applying the temporal generalized quantifier every Friday.  Then what is called an aggregating 
operation applies, which abstracts over the context variable of the TAC. 
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(7) a. "t[t # t* & "x[executive(x) & resign(x)(t)] & $y[secretary(y) % "t' [t' 
# after(t)(t*) & cry(y)(t')] 
 b. "x[executive(x) & "t[t # t* & resign(x)(t) & $y[secretary(y) % "t' [t' 
# after(t)(t*) & cry(y)(t')] 
 
The former is derived when the implicit existential quantifier takes scope over the 
subject in the TAC, as in (8)a, and the latter is derived when it takes scope under 
the TAC subject as in (8)b. 
 
(8) a. Every secretary cried after [IET [an executive resigned]] 
 b. Every secretary cried after [an executive [IET resigned]] 
The difference between the two interpretations is the scope relation between the 
existential quantifier over times and that over individuals, and the matrix subject 
(every secretary) always takes scope under both of them. 
 Second, Artstein assumes that the semantics of before is the mirror image 
of that of after.  This is not the case, however.  One piece of evidence for this is 
what is called a non-factual (or counter-factual) before as in: 
 
(9) John died before he saw his grandchildren.   
 
The sentence does not have the same truth conditions as John saw his grandchil-
dren after he died. Rather, it implies that he did not see his grandchildren.  In 
order to account for cases like this and others, Anscombe (1964) and Landman 
(1991) among others claim that before involves a universal quantification over 
times whereas after an existential quantification.  The truth conditions of the 
sentence (9) is roughly as follows: 
 
(10) "t[die(john)(t) & $t'[see(john)(his-grandchildren)(t') % t < t'] 
 
This correctly predicts that the sentence is vacuously true when there is no time at 
which John saw his grandchildren.  If this is correct, Artstein’s analysis is unable 
to capture non-factual readings of before since temporal prepositions are always 
associated with an implicit existential determiner, a determiner which has an 
existential quantifier built into it.   
 To solve this problem, we may assume an implicit universal determiner, in 
addition to the implicit existential determiner proposed by Artstein.  It might be 
that the former is applied to before-clauses and the latter to after-clauses.  This 
would correctly give us non-factual readings of before, but it fails to account for 
single-time readings of sentences like (1): Whether the implicit universal deter-
miner takes scope over or under the embedded subject, the resulting structures 
both yield a dependent-time interpretation. 
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3.  A Syntactic Approach: QR 
 
In this section, I consider a simple syntactic approach to derive the observed 
ambiguity, namely by using QR.  Under this analysis, the universally quantified 
subject in sentences like (1) is raised out of the TAC to scope over the existential 
subject in the matrix clause to yield a dependent-time reading, while the surface 
word order yields a single-time reading.  This simple analysis is not considered in 
Artstein (1995) since it violates the locality constraint of QR.   
 Examples like the following are claimed to show that QR is clause-bound:  
 
(11) One girl knows that every boy bought a present for Mary 
 
The sentence does not have a reading in which the embedded subject every boy 
takes scope over the matrix subject one girl.   
Fox (1995), however, argues that long-distance QR is allowed when it is 
semantically motivated.  Consider the following example from Moltman and 
Szabolcsi (1994): 
(12) One girl knows what every boy bought for Mary 
 
This example minimally differs from the above example in that it takes a question 
complement, and this difference also makes a scope difference.  The sentence 
allows the wide scope reading of every boy over one girl.  Fox argues that this is 
because, in order for every boy to take scope over one girl, it has to go through an 
intermediate as in (13).  The derivation (13)a is not semantically motivated since 
that is not a scope-taking element and moving every boy over that does not create 
any semantic differences.  The derivation in (13)b, on the other hand, is 
semantically motivated because what is a scope-taking element and moving every 
boy over what yield the so-called pair-list interpretation. 
 
(13) a. One girl knows [every boyi [that ti bought a present for Mary]] 
 b. One girl knows [every boyi [what ti bought for Mary]] 
 
If such analysis of QR is on the right track and temporal prepositions such as 
before and after are scope-taking elements as shown in the previous section, a QR 
analysis of deriving the ambiguity in TACs should not be dismissed simply 
because of the locality constraints.  This analysis is nicely extended to the contrast 
between TACs and non-TACs.  Recall that the dependent-time reading is not 
available with non-TACs like if/because/although-clauses.  If these connectives 
are not scope-taking elements, the unavailability of dependent-time readings 
follows. 
 In what follows, I point out an interesting correlation regarding TACs and 
non-TACs.  It seems that TACs allows wider varieties of dependencies than 
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non-TACs.  One is the availability of the dependent-time reading discussed 
throughout this paper.  Another is the availability of the so-called long-distance 
reading observed in Geis (1970).  Consider the following sentences: 
 
(14) a. I saw Mary in New York before she claimed that she would arrive. 
 b. I encountered Alice after she claimed that she left. 
 
Sentences like these are ambiguous between the so-called short-distance and 
long-distance interpretations.  Sentence (14)a, for instance, can have the following 
two readings: 
 
(15) a. short-distance: I saw Mary before the time at which she made the 
claim 
 b. long-distance: I saw Mary before her claimed time of arrival 
 
In the short-distance reading, the matrix event time is ordered with respect to the 
embedding event time of the TAC, namely the time at which she made the claim.  
In the long-distance reading, it is ordered with respect to the embedded event time 
of the TA, namely her arrival time according to what she claimed. 
 Unlike TACs, non-TACs such as although/because clauses do not allow 
such a long-distance reading.  Consider the following sentences from Larson 
(1990): 
 
(16) a. I still respect John although he claims that he killed his mother. 
 b. I visited New York because Mary dreamed that Max was there. 
 
These sentences are unambiguous.  (16)a, for instance, has a short-distance 
reading according to which I respect John despite his claiming that he killed his 
mother, but not a long-distance reading which is paraphrased as “despite what 
John claims, namely that he killed his mother, I respect him”.  Similarly, (16)b 
does not mean that I visited New York because of what Mary dreamed, namely 
that Max was there.  It seems then that the class of adjunct clauses that allow 
dependent-time readings and long-distance dependencies is the same.  
 Another interesting fact is cross-linguistic:  Artstein (1995) reports that 
German does not allow a dependent-time reading.  It does not allow a long- 
distance reading either, a fact observed in Larson (1990).  Japanese is another 
language that does allow neither a dependent-time reading nor a long-distance 
reading.   
 If we are to account for such correlations between the availability of 
dependent-time readings and long-distance dependencies in TACs and non-TACs, 
and cross-linguistically, a simple QR analysis may not be a good candidate. 
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4:  Another Syntactic Approach: Proposal 
 
This section proposes another syntactic analysis to derive the observed ambiguity.  
The single-time reading is derived from the surface word order.  The dependent- 
time reading is derived first by raising the entire TAC over the main clause as in 
(17)b, and then the subject of the TAC is moved out of the TAC, resulting in the 
structure in (17)c. 
 
(17) a. a secretary cried [after each executive resigned] 
 b. [[each executive resigned]i [a secretary cried [after ti]]] 
 c. [each executivek [[xk resigned]j [a secretary cried [after tj]]] 
 
4.1.  Formal Semantics 
 
I start with some syntactic and semantic assumptions.  Predicates come with a 
temporal variable in addition to usual individual variables.  Thus phrases like VPs 
denotes properties of times, of type <i,t>.  Tenses are temporal variable that 
saturate a temporal argument slot of the predicates they attach to.  They are bound 
by an existential quantifier. 
 
(18) a. Bill cried 
 b. [TP1 "i [TP2 pasti [VP Bill cry]]] 
 
Semantically, the past tense restricts the time of the predicates to a contextually 
given past time. 
 
(19) a. VP = !t[cry(bill)(t)] 
 b. TP2 = [ti # tpast & cry(bill)(ti)] 
 c. TP1 = "t[t # tpast & cry(bill)(t)] 
 
The final representation is the translation of the sentence.  It is true if and only if 
there is a time t during a contextually given past time and Bill cried at t. 
 When a quantificational NP is the subject, it can take scope over or under 
the temporal existential quantifier, as shown below: 
 
(20) a. ["i pasti [each executive resigned]] 
 b. [each executivei ["i pasti [xi resigned]] 
 
The former representation says that all executives resigned at the same time, and 
the latter says that each resigned at possibly different times. 
 Let us now turn to the syntax and semantics of TACs.  Recall the 
short-distance and long-distance ambiguity observed by Geis (1970), discussed in 
the previous section.  The relevant examples are repeated here: 
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(21) a. I saw Mary in New York before she claimed that she would arrive. 
 b. I encountered Alice after she claimed that she left. 
 
Larson (1990) claims that the kind of ambiguity observed in the TACs is similar 
to what we find in wh-questions and relative-clauses. 
 
(22) a. When did Mary claim that she would arrive? 
 b. I saw Mary in New York before the time at which she claimed that she 
would arrive  
 
These sentences are ambiguous.  (22)a, for example, can either be a question 
asking for the time Mary made the claim, or the time of her arrival according to 
her claim.  Similarly for (22)b.  Furthermore, these constructions are generally 
assumed to have an operator movement.  In wh-questions, wh-words such as when 
may originate in the matrix or embedded clauses, and depending on where it 
originates, the ambiguity arises.  Similarly, relative-clauses are assumed to have 
an operator movement.  Based on these facts, Larson (1990) proposes a null 
temporal operator movement in TACs. 
 
(23) a. I saw Mary in New York before OPi [she claimed ti [that she would 
arrive]] 
 b. I saw Mary in New York before OPi [she claimed [that she would 
arrive ti]] 
 
A null operator originates either in the embedding clause or embedded clause of 
the TAC and moves to the top of the TAC.  Evidence for such a movement 
analysis comes from the fact that the observed ambiguity disappears when the 
TAC contains an island.  The following sentence is unambiguous and only has a 
short-distance interpretation: 
 
(24) I saw Mary in New York before she made the claim that she would arrive. 
 
If a long-distance reading is due to a null operator movement from the embedded 
clause in the TAC, the unavailability of such a reading in sentences like (24) 
follows from a general locality constraint on movement. 
 I follow Larson (1990) and von Stechow (2002), and assume that TACs 
employ a null temporal operator movement.  A null operator is generated as a 
complement of a null preposition at and moves in front of the embedded clause.  
A simple embedded clause such as (after) Sue arrived has a structure like the 
following: 
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(25) a. (after) Sue arrived 
 b.  TP 
 
          OPj 
     "i     
     pasti            VP1 
 
     VP2          PP 
 
          Sue arrive          at tj 
 
I propose that a null operator itself is semantically vacuous, but when moved, it 
leaves a trace of type i.5  Following Heim and Kratzer (1998), I assume that the 
index of a moved element acts as a lambda abstractor over the index of its trace. 
 
(26) a. PP = !t[t = tj] 
 b. VP1 = !t[arrive(sue)(t) & t = ti] 
 c. TP = !tj"t[t # tpast & arrive(sue)(t) & t = tj] 
 
The temporal prepositions after and before translate as a function of type 
<<i,t>,<i,t>>.  A difference between the two is that after involves an existential 
quantification whereas before involves a universal quantification. 
 
(27) a. [[ after]]  = !P<i,t>!t"t' [P(t') & t' < t] 
 b. [[ before]]  = !P<i,t>!t$t' [P(t') % t < t'] 
 
Now let us see how TACs such as after-clauses modify the main clause.  After 
takes the embedded TP as its complement.  The entire TAC adjoins to the matrix 
VP. 
 
                                                
5
Larson (1990) says nothing about the semantics of such temporal operators.  The current 
analysis differs from von Stechow’s (2002), who proposes that the operator means something like 
‘the smallest time’. 
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(28)            TP1 
 
    "i      
    pasti             VP1 
 
    VP2           PP 
 
          Bill cry     after              TP2 
 
         Sue arrived 
 
The after-clause (i.e., the PP) denotes the property of times after a contextually 
relevant past event time of Sue’s leaving.  It ‘modifies’ the lower VP by adjoining 
to it.  Semantically, we get the intersection of the denotations of the PP and the 
VP2, as in (29)d. 
 
(29) a. TP2 = !tj "t[t # tpast & arrive(sue)(t) & t = tj] 
 b. PP = !t"t' "t'' [t'' # tpast & arrive(sue)(t'') & t'' = t' & t' < t] 
 c. VP2 = !t[cry(bill)(t)] 
 d. VP1 = !t[cry(bill)(t) & "t' "t'' [t'' # tpast & arrive(sue)(t'') & t'' = t' & t' < 
t] 
 e. TP1 = "t[t # tpast  & cry(bill)(t) & "t' "t'' [t'' # tpast & arrive(sue)(t'') & 
t'' = t' & t' < t] 
 
The final representation says that there is a time at which Bill cried and another 
time at which Sue arrived, both during a contextually relevant past time, and 
Bill’s crying time is after Sue’s arrival time. 
 Let us now come back to dependent-time interpretations of TACs.  Our 
proposal is that it is derived first by raising the complement clause of the temporal 
preposition as in (30)a.  The embedded quantificational subject is moved from 
this position to adjoin to the entire sentence.  
(30) a. [TP2 "m pastm Each executive resigned]j [TP1 "i pasti [VP1 [VP2 a secretary 
cry] [PP after tj]]] 
 b. [TP4 each executivek [TP3 [TP2 "m pastm xk resign]j [TP1 "i pasti [VP1 [VP2 a 
secretary cry] [PP after tj]]]]] 
 
Here are semantic representations at different stages: 
 
(31) a. TP1 = !P<i,t>"t' [t' # tpast & "y[secretary(y) & cry(y)(t') & "t'' [P(t'') & t'' 
< t']] 
 b. TP2 = !ti"t' [t' # tpast & resign(x)(t') & t' = ti] 
DEPENDENCIES IN TEMPORAL ADJUNCT CLAUSES 519
c. TP3 = "t' [t' # tpast & "y[secretary(y) & cry(y)(t') & "t'' "''' [t''' # tpast & 
resign(x)(t''') & t''' = t'' & t'' < t'] 
d. TP4 = $x[executive(x) % "t’[t’ # tpast & "y[secretary(y) & cry(y)(t') 
& "t'' "''' [t''' # tpast & resign(x)(t''') & t''' = t'' & t'' < t'] 
 
The final line correctly represents a dependent-time interpretation. 
 
4.2.  Some Consequences 
 
The observed ambiguity of quantifiers in TACs disappears when TACs contain a 
pronoun bound by a quantifier in the main clause: 
 
(32) [A secretary]i cried after each executive hit heri. 
 
The sentence above is unambiguous; it lacks a dependent-time reading.  This fact 
follows straightforwardly under the current analysis.  In order to yield the 
dependent-time reading, the entire TAC has to move to take scope over the matrix 
clause, and the resulting structure is the following: 
 
(33) [[each executive hit heri]j [[a secretary]i cried [after tj]]] 
 
The pronoun her in the TAC is no longer bound by the matrix subject.  The 
unavailability of the bound variable reading of her and the dependent-time 
reading at the same time cannot be accounted for under Artstein’s semantic 
analysis nor under a simple QR analysis. 
 Second, I show that the contrast between TACs and non-TACs regarding 
the availability of dependent-time readings.  I have argued that the raising of the 
embedded TP over the matrix clause is a necessary step to yield dependent-time 
readings.  Doing so out of TACs does not create any syntactic or semantic 
deviancy.  I argue that raising out of non-TACs on the contrary results in 
uninterpretability.  Let us see why.  If-clauses, for instance, are generally assumed 
to serve as a restrictor of a covert universal quantifier over possible worlds.  A 
rough translation of the sentence (34)a would be something like (34)b. 
(34) a. A secretary cried if each executive resigned. 
 b. $w[w is accessible from the actual world and each executive cried in 
w % a secretary cried in w] 
 
If the syntactic representation of sentences contains world variables, moving the 
embedded clause to take scope over the entire sentence would lead to an LF in 
which the world variable associated with the embedded verb resign is left 
unbound. 
 Lastly, let us consider languages like German and Japanese that allow 
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neither long-distance readings nor dependent-time readings.  I have argued, 
following Larson (1990), that long-distance readings in languages like English are 
due to a null temporal operator movement.  If so, there are two ways to account 
for the unavailability of such readings in languages like German and Japanese.  
One is to say that some locality constraint prohibits a null temporal operator in 
these languages from moving long-distance.  The other is to say that they do not 
employ such a null temporal operator movement.   
In Arregui and Kusumoto (1998), it was argued that Japanese TACs do 
not involve a null operator movement.  Evidence for this analysis comes from the 
behavior of tenses in TACs.  In languages like English, tenses in TACs behave 
like those in root clauses, that is, they are absolute tenses.  This means that despite 
the fact that tenses in TACs are syntactically embedded under the scope of tenses 
in the matrix clauses, they are evaluated with respect to the evaluation time of the 
sentence, not with respect to the tense immediately dominating them.  Under the 
current analysis, this is accomplished since the past tense in TACs like the 
following is bound by an existential quantifier immediately dominating it. 
 
(35) a. (after) Sue arrived 
 b. OPj "i pasti Sue arrive at tj 
 
At this point, i.e., before the operator meaning is applied, the structure " i pasti 
Sue arrive at tj denotes a truth value, of type t.  This is not the right type since 
temporal prepositions such as after requires their complement be of type <i,t>.  
When the null operator with a moved index is applied, the complement clause 
becomes of type <i,t>, an appropriate type to combine with after.  Thus, in 
languages like English, in which embedded tenses are interpreted as absolute 
tenses, a null operator movement is necessary for interpretability. 
 In languages like Japanese, however, it is agued that embedded tenses are 
relative tenses, i.e., tenses that are not evaluated with respect to the evaluation 
time of the sentence but to the dominating tenses.  Consider the following 
examples: 
 
(36) a. Junko-ga kaer-u/*kaet-ta            maeni Satoshi-ga ki-ta. 
  J-nom      leave-pres/leave-past before  S-nom      come-past 
  ‘Satoshi came before Junko left’ 
 b. Junko-ga kaer-u/*kaet-ta           maeni Satoshi-ga kur-u. 
  J-nom      leave-pres/leave-past before S-nom       come-pres 
  ‘Satoshi will come before Junko leaves’ 
 
(37) a. Junko-ga *kaer-u/kaet-ta           atoni Satoshi-ga ki-ta. 
  J-nom      leave-pres/leave-past after  S-nom       come-past 
  ‘Satoshi came after Junko left’ 
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 b. Junko-ga *kaer-u/kaet-ta           atoni Satoshi-ga kur-u. 
  J-nom      leave-pres/leave-past after  S-nom       come-pres 
  ‘Satoshi will come after Junko leaves’ 
 
In Japanese, tenses in maeni ‘before’-clauses are always present and those in 
atoni ‘after’-clauses are always past, whether tenses in the matrix clauses are 
present or past.  This means that they are not interpreted as absolute tenses.  If 
they were, the sentences would yield temporally incoherent interpretations.  
Tenses in TACs in Japanese are not interpreted in the same way as matrix tenses.  
That is, they are not existentially closed.  How are they interpreted then?  I 
propose, following the idea developed in Arregui and Kusumoto (1998), that they 
are bound by temporal prepositions themselves, as shown below: 
 
(38) [PP [TP [VP Junko-ga kaer-] presi] maenii] 
 
The index of the preposition correctly gives the right type (<i,t>) for the 
semantics of such prepositions without the help of a null temporal operator.  This 
way of interpreting embedded tenses would not give us an access to further 
embedded tenses, excluding long-distance dependencies in such languages.  If this 
analysis is on the right track, the TP complement of the temporal preposition in 
languages that do not have a null temporal operator movement cannot be raised 
because the raising would leave the embedded tense unbound.  This correctly 
predicts the correlation between the availability of dependent-time readings and 
that of long-distance dependencies, i.e., languages either allow both types of 
dependencies or neither ones. 
 
 
5.  Remaining Issues 
 
In this section, I discuss long-distance readings of TAC in more detail.  Some data 
regarding this phenomenon is problematic to theories like Artstein’s that derive 
long-distance dependencies by means of abstraction.  Other data are problematic 
to analyses that rely on movement, like the one presented here. 
 One problem is pointed out by von Stechow (1995), who argues against 
the analysis of temporal modifiers in Pratt and Francez (2001) which Artstein’s 
analysis is partly based on.  It is also noted by Artstein himself.  Artstein argues 
against a movement analysis like Larson’s and derives long-distance readings as 
follows.  Unlike other TACs, the complement clause of the temporal preposition 
like (39)a may choose not to have a temporal existential determiner applied at this 
point.  Instead, the verb’s temporal argument may be existentially closed, 
resulting the representation in (39)b: 
 
(39) a. (after) Alice claimed that she left 
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 b. "t[t # t* &claim(w*)(!w"t' [t' # t'* & leave(w)(alice)(t')])(alice)(t)] 
 
At this point, an abstraction over a temporal context variable applies.  Since there 
are two temporal context variables in (39)b, we have two possible representations: 
 
(40) a. !t*"t[t # t* & claim(w*)(!w"t'[t' # t'* & leave(w)(alice)(t')])(alice) 
(t)] 
 b. !t'*"t[t # t* & claim(w*)(!w"t'[t' # t'* & leave(w)(alice)(t')])(alice) 
(t)] 
 
When we abstract over the temporal context variable in the embedding clause in 
the TAC (i.e., t*), we get the representation in (40)a.  (40)b is the result of 
abstracting over the context variable in the embedded clause (i.e., t'*).  After this 
stage, contextualization and a temporal existential determiner apply before they 
are combined with the matrix clause.  The former yields a short-distance reading 
and the latter a long-distance reading.   
 Now the problem: The abstraction operation assumed here is semantic and 
thus there should be nothing wrong with abstracting over the temporal context 
variable in the embedded clause, t'*, out of an island in the following representa-
tion: 
 
(41) !t'*"t[t # t* & make-the-claim(w*)(!w"t' [t' # t'* & leave(w)(alice)(t')]) 
(alice)(t)] 
 
If this is possible, it would yield a long-distance reading for sentences that contain 
an island, which should be prohibited. 
 Artstein acknowledges this problem and yet argues that no-movement 
analyses such as his fare better.  He considers examples like the following: 
 
(42) I saw Mary after each boy claimed that she left. 
 
This sentence has a universally quantified subject in the TAC and hence possibly 
yields a single-time/aggregate or dependent-time ambiguity.6  It also has an 
embedding inside the TAC, which may yield short-distance or long-distance 
interpretations.  Thus the sentence should result in a four-way ambiguity, as 
shown in (43).  The fact is that the sentence is only three-ways ambiguous, 
lacking a long-distance/dependent-time reading. 
 
 
                                                
6
In considering the readings of examples like (42), Artstein does not distinguish single-time 
and aggregate readings, and uses the label of ‘aggregate’ reading for both.  This is perhaps because 
he concentrates on the lack of the long-distance/dependent-time readings.  We will come back to 
this point later. 
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(43) a. short-distance, single-time/aggregate: I saw Mary after the (last) 
claiming time 
 b. long-distance, single-time/aggregate: I saw Mary after the (last) 
claimed departure time 
 c. short-distance/dependent-time: I saw Mary after each act of claiming 
 d.* long-distance/dependent-time: I saw Mary after each claimed depar-
ture time 
 
Artstein argues that the unavailability of the long-distance/dependent-time reading 
follows.  First let us consider the computation where existential closure applies, 
followed by an abstraction operation, as in (39) and (40).  We get the following 
two representations: 
 
(44) a. !I"t[t # t* & $x[boy(x) % "t'[ t' # t & claim(w*)(!w"t'' [t'' # t'* & 
leave(w)(she)(t'')])(x)(t')] & I(after(t)(t*))] 
 b. !I"t[t # t* & $x[boy(x) % "t'[ t' # t'* & claim(w*)(!w"t'' [t'' # t & 
leave(w)(she)(t'')])(x)(t')] & I(after(t)(t*))] 
 
These are derived when an abstraction is over the embedding or embedded 
context variables.  The former yields the short-distance, aggregate reading 
whereas the latter the long-distance, aggregate reading. 
In addition to the above operation, Artstein claims that there are ‘normal’ 
ways to interpret TACs, that is to apply the implicit existential determiner either 
right above or below the quantified subject.   
 
(45) a. after [IET [each boy claimed that she left]] 
 b. !I"t[t # t* & $x[boy(x) % claim(w*)(!w"t' [t' # t'* & leave(w)(she) 
(t')])(x)(t)] & I(after(t)(t*))] 
 
(46) a. after [each boy [IET claimed that she left]] 
 b. !I$x[boy(x) % ["t[t # t* & claim(w*)(!w"t' [t' # t'* & leave(w)(she) 
(t')])(x)(t)] & I(after(t)(t*))] 
 
The former yields a short-distance/single-time reading (43)a, and the latter a 
short-distance/dependent-time reading (43)c.  If these four are the only options to 
interpret TACs, it means that there are no ways to derive a long-distance/ 
dependent-time reading. 
 Now let us examine single-time and aggregate readings in detail.  The 
operation to derive (44), namely, existential closure followed by abstraction over 
a context variable is first introduced to derive the so-called aggregate readings.  
Thus the readings derived by (44) are short-distance or long-distance aggregate , 
not s single-time, readings respectively.  The representations in (45) and (46) are 
derived without using the aggregating operation, and therefore do not yield 
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aggregate readings.  That is, under Artstein’s system, only four readings are 
derived, namely, short- distance/aggregate, long-distance/aggregate, short- 
distance/single-time, and short-distance/dependent readings.  While it correctly 
predicts the unavailability of long-distance/dependent readings, it misses to derive 
an available long-distance/single-time reading.  If Artstein is right about 
distinguishing the single-time and aggregate readings, this is another problem. 
 Let come back to a movement analysis.  The unavailability of long- 
distance/dependent readings is unexpected under a movement analysis, Artstein 
argues, because an explicit temporal operator movement such as the following has 
a so-called pair-list reading with a long-distance dependency. 
 
(47) When did each boy claim that Mary left? 
 
This question sentence can be answered with “Adam claimed she left at noon, Bill 
claimed she left at 13:00, etc”.  If overt wh-movement and covert temporal 
operator movement in TACs are treated on a par, dependent-time readings should 
be allowed with long-distance dependencies.  I do not have a solution to this 
problem, but would like to point out one interesting fact.  Relative clauses seem to 
behave similarly to TACs rather than to wh-movement, despite that they are 
assumed to involve an overt relative pronoun movement.  Consider the following: 
 
(48) I saw Mary after the time at which each boy claimed that she left. 
 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to get a long-distance/dependent-time reading 
with this sentence.  If so, there may be an independent reason to block such a 
reading in TACs. 
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